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ABSTRACT 
 Recent debates on transitional justice have concerned whether the field responds 
to the needs of victims who have suffered serious crimes.  At the global level, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) serves as the most visible institution of transitional 
justice and is most famous for its prosecutions of war criminals.  Critics of the Court 
question its relevance to victims and allege that it embodies a Western form of justice, 
prioritizing retribution over restoration of victims’ lives and societies.  Often overlooked, 
however, is the Court’s sister organization, the Trust Fund For Victims (TFV).  Also 
established by the Rome Statute, the TFV is mandated to deliver court-ordered 
reparations to victims as well as to provide assistance to those affected by crimes under 
ICC jurisdiction.  This assistance mandate creates a novel opportunity to reach a wide 
scope of affected individuals and to bring international justice directly to those who need 
it most.  This thesis reviews research on transitional justice and employs the Trust Fund 
as a case study of localizing transitional justice through reparative assistance.  This study 
 v 
concludes that the reparative assistance, when designed to respond to victims’ needs, has 
material and symbolic significance to victims that meet the goals of transitional justice. 
 vi 
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1. Introduction 
“Retributive justice is largely Western. The African understanding is far more 
restorative—not so much to punish as to redress or restore a balance that has been 
knocked askew. The justice we hope for is restorative of the dignity of the people.”  
– Archbishop Desmond Tutu1 
Established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) was designed to prevent impunity for atrocities 
through its jurisdiction over four crimes: crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, 
and the crime of aggression.2  The ICC’s establishment fulfilled a vision first presented in 
the 1948 Genocide Conventions by creating a permanent international institution that 
could hold individuals accountable for massive crimes.  No longer could war criminals 
commit atrocities with impunity, hiding behind the shield of national sovereignty.  In 
addition, the Rome Statute goes beyond determining criminal responsibility by 
mandating the Court system to contribute to efforts to restore and maintain peace and 
security and “to guarantee lasting respect and enforcement for international justice.”3  
 The Rome Statute’s most innovative provisions established a Trust Fund for 
Victims (TFV) as a mechanism to deliver Court-ordered reparations, including 
restitution, rehabilitation, and compensation, against convicted persons to victims, as 
stipulated in Article 75.  Furthermore, Article 79 allows the Trust Fund to use funds “for 
the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of 
                                                
1 Quoted in Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after 
Genocide and Mass Atrocity (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998): 81.  
2 Art. 5-8, ICC Statute. 
3 “Preamble,” ICC Statute. 
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such victims.”4  Rule 98 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence elaborates on the 
Trust Fund’s reparations role, particularly “where the number of victims and the scope, 
forms and modalities of reparations makes a collective award more appropriate.”5  Rule 
98 also makes clear that the Trust Fund can use voluntary contributions to provide 
assistance to victims independent of Court orders on reparation.  These provisions 
respond to the reality that victims need more than a criminal prosecution to recover from 
grave crimes. 
Based on Article 79 in the Rome Statue, the mandates and operations of the Trust 
Fund have been elaborated in resolutions by the ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP).  
The Trust Fund operates under the dual mandate to (a) implement reparation orders of the 
Court and (b) provide physical or psychological rehabilitation or material assistance for 
the benefit of victims and their families.6  This dual mandate gives the Trust Fund the 
power to act on behalf of a larger scope of victims and at an earlier date than would be 
afforded by the Court-ordered reparations mandate alone.7  The Trust Fund may begin 
rehabilitation or support as soon as the Chief Prosecutor initiates an investigation, 
                                                
4 Resolution ICC-ASP/I/Res.6, Establishment of a Fund for the Benefit of Victims of 
Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, and of the Families of Such Victims, adopted at the 
3rd plenary meeting by consensus, 9 September 2002. 
5 Rule 98(3), ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
6 Katharina Peschke, “The Role and Mandates of the ICC Trust Fund For Victims,” in 
Victims of International Crimes: An Interdisciplinary Discourse, ed. Torsten Bonacker and 
Christoph Safferling (The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013) 319; “The Two Roles 
of the TFV,” The Trust Fund For Victims, last accessed March 5, 2014, 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/two-roles-tfv. 
7 Katharina Peschke, “The Role and Mandates of the ICC Trust Fund For Victims,” 323. 
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responding to victims whose suffering may require attention before criminal convictions 
in the Court.8   
While the ICC shares the goal of ending impunity for mass atrocities with its 
predecessors, these provisions for the TFV institutionalize concern for the victim.  The 
statute also provides for victim participation in criminal proceedings, but this 
participation will necessarily be limited in cases of mass atrocity by the large scope of 
victims.  By moving beyond victim participation in proceedings and Court-ordered 
reparations, the Trust Fund has the possibility of bringing assistance directly to those who 
have suffered international crimes, endowing the Rome Statute system with an 
unprecedented mechanism to bring international justice to local populations.9   
This concern for victims emerged from an international consensus on victims’ 
right to reparation under international law, most clearly articulated in the United Nations 
Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.  
Adopted by the General Assembly in 1985, this declaration guarantees victims the right 
to reparation for “the return of property or payment for the harm or loss suffered, 
reimbursement of expenses incurred as a result of the victimization, the provision of 
services, and the restoration of rights.”10  The right to reparation also appears in earlier 
                                                
8 Anne-Marie de Brouwer, “Reparation to Victims of Sexual Violence: Possibilities at the 
International Criminal Court and at the Trust Fund for Victims and Their Families,” Leiden 
Journal of International Law 20 (2007), 231. 
9 Conor McCarthy, “Victim Redress and International Criminal Justice: Competing 
Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of Justice?” Journal of International Criminal Justice 10 
(2012), 354. 
10 Art. 8, Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power. 
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documents, including Universal Declaration of Human Right, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture.11  These documents 
considered reparations to be guaranteed by the state, but ICC is the first permanent 
organization to formalize a reparations regime that extends responsibility to provide 
reparations from the individual perpetrators and the state to the international 
community.12 
 Established by the United Nations, the Court and the TFV can be considered an 
international endeavor into transitional justice, a field which, broadly speaking, concerns 
responses to mass atrocity and repression.13  By permanently establishing a Court for 
international crimes and a fund to assist victims and their families, the Rome Statute 
institutionalizes principles of restorative and retributive justice encompassed by 
contemporary conceptions of transitional justice.  This form of international intervention 
engages a number of debates regarding transitional justice in theory and practice, the role 
of criminal prosecutions following atrocities, and, most importantly, the effects on 
victims of international crimes. 
Is Transitional Justice Biased? 
 Critics of transitional justice allege that the field embodies a Western bias.  These 
critics suggest that transitional justice is a form of neo-colonialism that enables powerful 
                                                
11 Peter G. Fischer, “The Victims’ Trust Fund of the International Criminal Court—
Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme,” Emory International Law Review 187 (2003), 
198. 
12 Ibid., 199-200. 
13 This study adopts “transitional justice” to refer to the array of judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms that aim to confront large-scale human rights abuses. 
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Western states to intervene in weaker states, particularly in Africa.14  Many transitional 
justice programs have incorporated extensive participation by the international legal 
community, which has sometimes applied a “one size fits all” model to societies 
recovering from violence or authoritarianism.15  This bias is further illustrated by 
transitional justice’s focus on punishing perpetrators of crimes rather than on the 
immediate needs of those who suffered the crimes.  As the only permanent international 
institution of justice, the ICC is subject to much of this criticism.16  In addition, all 
existing ICC investigations are in Africa.  As explained by Nicholas Waddell and Phil 
Clark, “the Court’s focus on Africa has stirred African sensitivities about sovereignty and 
self-determination—not least because of the continent’s history of colonisation and a 
pattern of decisions made for Africa by outsiders.”17  A response to this claim is that the 
ICC can only consider violations since 2002, and many, though certainly not all, of these 
cases have occurred in Africa.18  More generally, transitional justice scholars have sought 
                                                
14 Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, “From the Neocolonial ‘Transitional’ to Indigenous 
Formations of Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 7 (2013): 197-204. 
15 Fiounnuala Ní Aoláin, “Expanding the Boundaries of Transitional Justice,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 22 (2008): 218. 
16 Mwangi S. Kimenyi, “Can the International Criminal Court Play Fair in Africa,” 
Brookings, last modified October 17, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-
focus/posts/2013/10/17-africa-international-criminal-court-kimenyi; Faith Karimi, “African 
Union accuses ICC of bias, seeks delay of cases against sitting leaders,” CNN, last modified 
October 12, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/12/world/africa/ethiopia-au-icc-summit. 
17 Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark introduction to Courting Conflict?: Justice, Peace 
and the ICC in Africa, edited by Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark, (London: Royal Africa 
Society, 2008), 8-9. 
18 Drexler, “Whither Justice?,” 98 
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to combat accusations of bias by focusing on incorporating local conceptions of justice, 
surveying and studying victims’ perceptions and needs, and trying to understand when 
and how transitional justice fails victims. 
Harvey Weinstein argues that transitional justice should work to incorporate local 
perceptions of justice and to consider “the impact of non-Western cultures and different 
beliefs” on practices of justice.19  Similarly, Alexander Hinton suggests that conceptions 
of justice as transcendent and universal prevent transitional justice actors from 
considering the ways justice is perceived, experienced, conceptualized, and produced at 
the local level.20  These calls for consideration of local justice have led to the extensive 
study of the gacaca hearings in Rwanda, as well as some studies on “traditional” justice 
practices in Uganda, Guatemala, and Timor Leste.21  While some laud efforts to localize 
transitional justice, several of these studies illustrate the illegitimacy and failures of 
“traditional” mechanisms.  For example, gacaca in some cases had the effect of 
exacerbating tensions in Rwanda, while mato oput rituals in Uganda represented the 
                                                
19 Harvey M. Weinstein, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 
(2007): 1-5. 
20 Alexander L. Hinton, “Introduction: Toward an Anthropology of Transitional Jusice,” 
in Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass 
Violence ed. Alexander L Hinton (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010). 
21 See, for example, chapters on Uganda, Guatemala, Peru, and Burundi in Localizing 
Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence, edited by Rosalind Shaw, 
Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2010); Also see 
Alison Des Forges and Timothy Longman, “Legal responses to genocide in Rwanda,” in My 
Neighbor, My Enemy, 49-68. 
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interests of a few “traditional” leaders and international organizations, rather than the 
local population more generally.22 
 Alongside calls for the study of local practices of justice, scholars have begun to 
focus on the perceptions and judgments of victims.  Recent research suggests that for 
transitional justice to achieve its goals, its mechanisms most involve a participatory 
approach that incorporates locals at every stage of the process, from conception to design 
to administration.23  These researchers note that the emphasis on direct injustices against 
individuals, in the form of international crimes, often ignores the injustices that led to the 
crimes.24  Empirical research in the form of population-based surveys corroborates these 
arguments, suggesting that local participation in the decision-making process is the most 
important feature of successful transitional justice mechanisms.25  This research also 
addresses claims about the relative importance to victims of various forms of justice.  In 
general, these studies find that victims in transitional societies prioritize measures of 
justice that help facilitate the return to a normal life, for example through reparations that 
                                                
22 Phil Clark, “Hybridity, Holism and Traditional Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts 
in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” George Washington International Law Review 39 (2007); Tim Allen, 
“Ritual (Ab)use? Problems with Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda,” in Courting Conflict? 
Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, edited by Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark, (London: Royal 
Africa Society, 2008). 
23 Patrick Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice 
from the Bottom Up,” Journal of Law and Society 35 (2008): 266; Bloomfield, David, “On Good 
Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation,” Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict 
Management Report (2006). 
24 Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?,” 273. 
25 Phuong Pham and Patrick Vinck, “Empirical Research and the Development and 
Assessment of Transitional Justice Mechanisms,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 
(2007): 231-48. 
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restore livelihoods.26  In addition to these priorities, these victims still demand 
accountability for the injustices committed. 
Other scholars have been more critical of transitional justice, highlighting the 
ways it has failed its victims.  Tshepo Madlingozi argues transitional justice experts 
“produce” victimhood in their attempts to speak about and for victims.27  Transitional 
justice, he argues, should focus on redistribution of resources and power, rather than just 
seeking to tell the story of marginalized victims.  Similarly, Marie Smyth suggests that 
truth recovery processes can inadvertently perpetuate a “victim culture,” reopen old 
wounds, and raise unrealistic expectations about their therapeutic effects.28  Ralph 
Henham argues that the participation of victims in international criminal proceedings 
needs to extend beyond the symbolic in order to fully address victims’ notions of truth 
and justice.29   
Trials after Mass Atrocities 
Many allegations of transitional justice’s bias focus on the role of trials, a central 
focus in the field of study.  Early transitional justice scholars argue that criminal 
                                                
26 Pham et al., “When the War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about 
Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda,” 49; “The Dust Has Not Yet 
Settled: Victims’ Views on the Right to Remedy and Reparation,” United Nationals Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner Report, 72. 
27 Tshepo Madlingozi, “On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of 
Victims,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 2 (2010); 208-28. 
28 Marie Smyth, “Truth, partial truth, and irreconcilable truths: Reflections on the 
prospects for truth recovery in Northern Ireland,” Smith College Studies in Social Work 73 
(2003): 205-25. 
29 Ralph Henham, “Conceptualizing Access to Justice and Victims’ Rights in 
International Sentencing, Social & Legal Studies 13 (2007): 27-55. 
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prosecutions can contribute to peace and reconciliation by achieving justice, constructing 
truth, and individualizing guilt.30  Since then, discussions of trials have centered around 
(1) their political and practical shortcomings; (2) their relationship with peace and 
deterrence; and (3) whether they represent a uniquely Western form of justice.  
Shortcomings of Trials 
Martha Minow identifies three crucial complications confronted by the first 
international criminal tribunals: retroactivity, selectivity, and politicization.  Retroactivity 
describes a situation in which defendants face charges under norms that had not been 
established in law at the time of their criminal action.31  The Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo 
War Crime Trials following World War II famously prosecuted defendants based on 
norms that were not codified under international law until the postwar period.  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also raised questions of retroactivity 
by applying for the first time international human rights law to conduct that occurred 
within a nation’s borders; this application arguably implicates defendants who were 
unaware that these international norms applied to their individual conduct within a single 
nation.  The Rome Statute overcomes retroactivity in ICC prosecutions by defining its 
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of 
                                                
30 Phil Clark, “Law, politics and pragmatism: The ICC and case selection in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda,” in Courting Conflict? Justice Peace and the ICC in 
Africa, ed. Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman (London: Royal Africa Society), 297-314.; . 
Kritz, “Progress and Humility,” 55; Teitel, Transitional Justice. 
31 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 33. 
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aggression.  The scope of this jurisdiction applies only to crimes committed since July 1, 
2002, when the Rome Statute came into force.32 
A second concern of trials, politicization, is when courts fail to serve as 
independent institutions isolated from political pressures.33  When a court is dependent on 
a government for its operations, as in Yugoslavia, its impartiality is undermined.  In 
addition, Western states’ domination of the Security Council, where the international 
tribunals originated, could mean that the tribunals are sensitive to the political alignments 
of powerful nations, whose support is necessary for the tribunals to exist and function.  
The Rome Statute has not successfully deterred accusations of politicization.  As will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 in more detail, many have questioned the ICC’s collaboration with 
the Ugandan government during its investigations as well as a possible bias against 
Africa. 
Third, prosecutions following mass atrocities necessarily grapple with selectivity, 
the reality that only a small portion of individuals involved in an atrocity can practically 
be prosecuted.34  To prevent collective guilt from plaguing a post-conflict society, guilt 
must be ascribed to selected individuals based on significant evidence.  Focusing on 
individuals from a specific group, however, may create feelings of bitterness and have 
                                                
32 ICC Statute. 
33 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 31. 
34 Ibid., 40. 
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detrimental effects on societal reconciliation.35  Some may perceive the prosecution of 
only leaders as violating the principle of individual responsibility, and individual 
accountability is an important component of social reconstruction.36  This limitation 
raises the risk of creating martyrs out of the few who are prosecuted, as well as producing 
perceptions of unfairness.37  The Court has demonstrated a commitment to prosecuting 
only individuals at the top of a chain of command that led to an international crime. 
Peace and Deterrence 
A more specific criticism challenges the role of trials in cases of ongoing 
conflicts.  Advocates of prosecutions suggest that they can lead to peace and justice, 
while critics fear that prosecutions will deter the peace process.38  ICC Chief Prosecutor 
Moreno Ocampo, an outspoken advocate of prosecutions, argues that the ICC forces 
armed groups to the negotiating table, raises issues of accountability, deters additional 
crimes, weakens external support for armed groups, and promotes reconciliation.39  Max 
du Plessis and Jolyon Ford argue that prosecutions demonstrate commitment to the rule 
of law and responsiveness to international crimes, resulting in a strengthening of national 
                                                
35 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, “A world unto itself? The application of 
international justice in the former Yugoslavia,” in My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and 
Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 29. 
36 Des Forges and Longman, “Legal responses to genocide in Rwanda,” 49-68. 
37 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 45. 
38 Patrick Wegner, “Ambiguous Impacts: The Effects of International Criminal Court 
Investigations in Northern Uganda,” Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 22 (2012), 10. 
39 Luis Moreno Ocampo, “Building a Future on Peace and Justice: The International 
Criminal Court,” cited in Wegner, “Ambiguous Impacts,” 13. 
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justice capacities.40  Similarly, Frank Van Acker argues that any attempts at conflict 
resolution that offer amnesty to perpetrators of international crimes will incentivize 
further crime and fail to achieve peace and justice.41 
Critics of prosecutions in ongoing conflicts argue that they might deter peace 
negotiations and conflict resolution efforts.  In particular, critics suggest that parties may 
reject a compromise if they fear prosecution after the conflict.42  In some cases, amnesties 
might play a role in ending hostilities and paving the way for reconciliation.  Some 
authors even claim that criminal prosecutions can result in increased hostilities.43  A 
consensus has yet to arise concerning this question, partially due to the lack of empirical 
data from conflict contexts.44 
Relevance of Trials 
An additional debate regarding prosecutions in post-conflict societies concerns 
the relevance of prosecutions altogether.  In some situations, victims may be less 
                                                
40 Max Du Plessis and Jolyon Ford, Introduction to Unable or Unwilling? Case Studies 
on Domestic Implementation of the ICC Statute in Selected African Countries, edited by Max Du 
Plessis and Jolyon Ford, Institute for Security Studies Report, 2008:  x. 
41 Frank Van Acker, “Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: the new order no one 
ordered,” African Affairs 103 (2004): 355-356. 
42 Payam Akhavan, “Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: 
Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism,” Human Rights Quarterly, 31 (2009): 
625; C. L. Sriram, “Conflict Mediation and the ICC :Challenges and Options for Pursuing Peace 
with Justice at the Regional Level,” cited in Wegner, Ambiguous Impacts,” 10. 
43 Marc Osiel, “Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 22 (2000) 118-47; David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict 
Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?” International Studies Review 6 (2004): 355-80. 
44 Wegner, “Ambiguous Impacts,” 9.  
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concerned with the prosecution of a few key leaders than with the immediate redress of 
their suffering.45  Advocates of restorative justice in post-conflict settings argue that 
retribution fails to deter crimes or provide justice for victims.46  Rather than punishing 
perpetrators, efforts at justice should seek social integration through alternative 
mechanisms, such as truth commissions or reparations.   
Several transitional justice scholars continue to maintain that trials can promote 
reconciliation by beginning to address the needs of victims and by individualizing guilt to 
prevent perceptions of collective guilt.47  Proponents of prosecutions note that trials have 
effects beyond the punishment and condemnation of perpetrators.  Mark Osiel argues that 
trials can help a nation construct memories and engage in reparative rituals of 
commemoration.48  Trials can also help articulate norms that will characterize the post-
transition society and can yield some measure of accountability.49  Diane Orentlicher 
                                                
45 Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Conclusion: a common objective, a universe of 
alternatives,” in My Neighbor, My Enemy, 323-342. 
46 Mark Drumbl, “Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame in Rwanda,” New 
York University Law Review 75 (2000), 1323. 
47 Antonio Cassese, “Reflections on International Criminal Justice,” Modern Law Review 
61 (1998): 6; Minow, Between Justice and Forgiveness, 51; Catherine Lu, “The International 
Criminal Court as an Institution of Moral Regeneration: Problems and Prospects,” in Bringing 
Power to Justice?: The Prospects of the International Criminal Court, edited by Joanna 
Harrington, (Montreal: Mcgill Queens University Press, 2006); Diane Orentlicher, “‘Settling 
Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency,” The International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 10. 
48 Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997) 6. 
49 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 50. 
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argues that victims across cultures “thirst for justice in the form of prosecutions,” and that 
trials must be a part of any transitional justice experience.50 
Reparations and Holistic Justice 
By the twenty-first century, transitional justice had come to encompass an array 
of mechanisms beyond trials, such as truth commissions, lustration, reparations, 
memorialization, amnesties, institutional reforms, and reconciliation.  Many scholars and 
practitioners advocate for a “holistic approach” to transitional justice, arguing that the 
variety of mechanisms can serve as a sort of “menu” which can be tailored to the unique 
context and needs of each situation.51  The International Center for Transitional Justice 
adopts this approach, claiming, “No single measure is as effective on its own as when 
combined with other mechanisms.”52  This approach helps combat accusations that 
transitional justice serves Western interests or prioritizes trials, which may have limited 
relevance to victims of grave crimes.  Reparations and reparative practices in particular 
may have the potential to help victims meet their immediate needs. 
Reparations are practices that aim to rectify, correct, or ameliorate the condition 
of parties who have suffered certain injuries.53  When designed to recompense victims 
rather than to punish perpetrators, reparations can be considered a form of restorative 
                                                
50 Orentlicher, “‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited,” 22. 
51 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance, 24.  
52 Quoted in Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance, 24. 
53 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Reparations in the aftermath of repression and mass violence,” 
in My Neighbor, My Enemy, 121. 
15 
 
justice, which emerged as a rejection of the punitive nature of retributive justice.54  Critics 
of retributive justice argue that its focus on punishing victims alienates offenders and 
makes it more difficult for societal reintegration.  Restorative justice renounces the crime 
committed, rather than the person who committed the crime, and encourages repentance 
and forgiveness, as well as the empowerment of all involved.55  Following this model, 
reparations aim to help repair the harm suffered by victims who have experienced 
physical violations, property destruction, or loss of livelihoods.56  Ideally, the wrongdoer 
bears the costs of reparations; where impossible, the state assumes the responsibility to 
provide reparations.57  Reparations can be material or symbolic and awarded on an 
individual or collective basis.58 
Material reparations include financial compensation and restitution and generally 
address specific harms resulting from a crime.59  Restitution describes the return to the 
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victim of specific, misappropriated object, such as rights, jobs, benefits, and property.60  
Restitution represents an ideal form of reparation but is often unattainable because the 
“object” of a crime may be lost or immaterial.  Compensation, a second form of material 
reparation, includes measures that aim to reduce suffering through monetary 
quantification of the harm.61  A third form of material reparation, rehabilitation, 
comprises measures that provide social, medical, psychological, or legal services 
designed to improve the conditions of a victim.62 
Material reparations can help diminish victims’ desire for revenge, thus reducing 
the chances of recurring conflict.63  In addition, material reparations can have practical 
benefits, such as persuading victims to testify.  The Rome Statute provides victims with 
standing to request and receive reparation from a person convicted in the Court, and the 
Trust Fund may provide material reparation before a defendant is convicted.64  Though 
material, these three forms of reparation all carry symbolic significance.  While they may 
help victims materially to different extents, they necessarily acknowledge an admission 
of guilt and the vindication of the victim.65   
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Symbolic reparations, including apologies, monuments, and memorials, 
acknowledge the harmfulness of the crimes on individuals and societies without directly 
trying to redress a specific harm.  Apology, the verbal acknowledgement of responsibility 
for injustice, is one common type of symbolic reparation.66  Apologies acknowledge the 
truth of injustices, accept some responsibility, express sincere regret, and promise non-
repetition.67  This communication between victim and perpetrator may help facilitate 
reconciliation.  Other “moral reparations” include the disclosure of facts, public naming, 
and removing perpetrators or bystanders from power, measures which can be instituted 
through reparations programs, truth commissions, or administrative policies.68  Truth 
commissions, though sometimes considered a form of restorative justice distinct from 
reparations, reveal narrative, dialogic, and evidential truths.69 
In post-conflict situations, reparations may carry a few risks.  If apologies come 
from a new government or another party that is not directly responsible for the 
wrongdoing, they will have less meaning to the victims than if from the perpetrator.70  
Similarly, material reparations may trivialize victims’ suffering by suggesting that the 
amends offer full remedy and not addressing underlying causes of the harm.71  In cases of 
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civil war, dividing survivors of armed conflict into “victims” entitled to reparations and 
“perpetrators” subject to prosecutions or truth-telling procedures can perpetuate divisions 
and fail to address the moral ambiguity of civil wars.72  Reparations designed to help 
large collectives, such as rehabilitation programs, may obfuscate of the government’s 
distinct obligations to make reparations and to provide essential services.73  It can also be 
difficult to target reparations appropriately, which raises concerns of favoritism and 
resentment.  Theo Van Boven argues that reparations under international law must not be 
confused with development.74  For reparations to be meaningful to victims, they must 
explicitly be linked to the injustice suffered by victims.   
To minimize these risks, Naomi Roht-Arriaza suggests that any reparations 
program acknowledge that it can never “return victims to the state they would have been 
in had the violations not occurred.”75  Like other transitional justice measures, the process 
of deciding the form of reparations must include victims fully.76  Otherwise, victims will 
not feel empowered and reparations may have a divisive effect.  Minow points out that 
the type of reparations implemented may matter less than victim participation in the 
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development of the program.77  This claim parallels other research on transitional justice 
mechanisms, which suggests that victim involvement and participation in the policies at 
every stage are crucial to the programs’ success.78  Like trials, reparations are shown to 
achieve the goals of transitional justice most successfully when combined with other 
measures, such as amnesties or truth commissions.79 
Research Question and Thesis Outline 
While the debate on trials in ongoing conflicts remains contested, a growing 
consensus among post-conflict criminologists and justice theorists transcends the 
dichotomy of retributive and restorative justice, acknowledging that principles of both 
practices can coexist and effectively respond to post-conflict realities.80  This position 
acknowledges that, in addition to achieving punitive retribution, prosecutions can have 
reparative effects by mobilizing reparations to victims, documenting truth about the 
crimes, and formally condemning injustices.81  Trials should be combined with other 
measures such as reparations or amnesties, but are necessary for transitional justice to 
achieve its goals.82  This complementarity of restorative and retributive principles is 
reflected in the Rome Statue, which integrates a reparations regime into the Court system. 
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 This study understands the Rome Statute’s reparations regime as an attempt to 
incorporate restorative principles of justice into international criminal law.  The Trust 
Fund’s second mandate, to provide assistance to victims outside of Court-ordered 
reparations, particularly appeals to restorative ideals.  By focusing on victims and their 
families, the TFV can counter accusations that the Rome Statute system focuses on 
retribution—the punishment of perpetrators—rather than restoration.  More broadly, 
reparative assistance provided in an international transitional justice context challenges 
accusations that transitional justice is inherently biased in favor of the West.  Through a 
case study of the Trust Fund For Victims’ operations in northern Uganda, this study seeks 
to answer the question, Can a focus on reparative assistance achieve justice for victims of 
international crimes? 
 Chapter 2 begins by seeking to situate the Rome Statute system within the history 
of international criminal law and transitional justice.  This chapter first traces the 
concomitant development of transitional justice and international criminal law and then 
examines the construction of transitional justice as a field of study.  This background 
helps elucidate the context surrounding the Rome Statute’s creation and adoption at the 
turn of the century.  Finally, this chapter concludes by suggesting that the creation of the 
International Criminal Court and the Trust Fund For Victims represents an international 
institutionalization of transitional justice. 
 Chapter 3 begins the case study of northern Uganda.  First, it reviews Uganda’s 
history of violent governance and civil war that set the scene for the conflict that 
ultimately led to an ICC investigation.  The chapter proceeds by exploring the Court’s 
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history in Uganda, as well as the controversies surrounding the Court’s intervention.  
These highly contested debates about the ICC’s involvement in Uganda are essential to 
understand the challenges faced by the TFV, which is so closely linked to the Court.   
Chapter 4 continues the case study by examining in depth the Trust Fund’s 
operations in northern Uganda.  In particular, this chapter studies the Trust Fund’s three 
types of programming, drawing extensively on internal and external reports.  This 
programming is evaluated in terms of the extent to which it achieves the goals of 
transitional justice described in Chapter 2.  In addition, original interviews conducted in 
May 2013 help illuminate some challenges faced by the Trust Fund.  The case study 
concludes that despite some shortcomings, the TFV is playing a valuable role in post-
conflict Uganda by contributing physically and symbolically to societal recovery. 
Chapter 5 concludes the study by returning to the key debates in transitional 
justice.  As the first attempt to provide reparative assistance in the context of international 
criminal justice, the Trust Fund’s operations in northern Uganda present a response to 
many of the criticisms of transitional justice.  If future transitional justice endeavors 
follow a similar model and improve on shortcomings, the TFV, through its focus on 
reparative assistance, may play an instrumental role in shaping international transitional 
justice. 
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2. Transitional Justice from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court 
 Transitional justice concerns the various responses to widespread violations of 
human rights in the aftermath of authoritarian rule or violent conflict.  Though the term 
“transitional justice” emerged in the 1990s to describe responses to the falls of 
authoritarian regimes in the 1980s, it encompasses mechanisms of justice that stem at 
least as far back as the Nuremberg Trials in 1945 and 1946.83  Since then, the field has 
developed to encompass a variety of goals and mechanisms that aim to redress abuses of 
human rights.  Goals of transitional justice include the restoration of the rule of law; 
judicial retribution; recompense and the affirmation of dignity of victims; reform of 
institutions; social and political reconciliation; nation-building; and reconstitution of the 
past.84  This chapter suggests that the creation of the International Criminal Court and the 
Trust Fund for Victims represents an international institutionalization of transitional 
justice.  Toward this end, the chapter reviews the history of transitional justice, beginning 
with its roots in international criminal law and continuing to its establishment as a field at 
the turn of the century.  This review elucidates the two underlying goals of transitional 
justice: redress for past abuses and progress toward a more just future.  Finally, this 
chapter ends with a discussion of how the Rome Statue incorporates these transitional 
justice ideals and finds that provisions for assistance to victims through the Trust Fund 
allow the international community to respond directly to victims’ needs. 
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Roots of Transitional Justice 
 While transitional justice as a self-conscious field emerged in the 1990s, its roots 
parallel the development of international criminal law beginning after World War II and 
continuing throughout the twentieth century.  Ruti Teitel outline three phases of 
transitional justice: the period following World War II; the democratic transitions of the 
1970s and 1980s; and the civil wars and genocides of the 1990s and early 2000s.85  These 
roughly defined phases provide a useful framework to trace the development of 
transitional justice in practice in the twentieth century and to identify its intersections 
with international criminal law. 
The Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials following World War II 
marked the beginning of individual accountability under international law for massive 
human rights violations.  For the first time, international criminal law applied to 
individuals in addition to states.86  While these trials represented a monumental 
development for international criminal law, the trials have been heavily criticized as a 
form of victors’ justice.  Post-war proceedings fell short in the three ways discussed in 
the first chapter: bias, retroactivity, and selectivity.  The trials failed to prosecute crimes 
committed by Allied forces, particularly systematic rape employed by Soviet forces; 
applied norms retroactively, before the codification of crimes against humanity; and only 
charged a small portion of those who could be charged with violations.87   
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Despite these shortcomings, the postwar era established an important legacy that 
served as the basis for modern human rights law and transitional justice.88  For example, 
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter defines crimes against humanity as large-scale 
persecution, enslavement, deportation, or other inhumane acts, and Article 7 rejects 
immunity for commanders of such crimes.89  The postwar era also saw the emergence of 
international treaties and declarations that began to create the norms of transitional 
justice: the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.  In addition, a clause in the 1948 Genocide Convention indicated that an 
international court would be established to prosecute perpetrators of genocide, but Cold 
War politics postponed its realization.90  Treaties in the following decades continued the 
expansion of the international human rights regime.  These documents enshrined an 
emerging international consensus on the rights of individuals and the obligations of states 
to protect those rights. 
 Teitel’s second phase surrounds the democratic transitions of Latin America and 
Eastern Europe.91  These transitions began to develop transitional justice mechanisms 
informed by principles of restorative justice in an effort to end patterns of abuse and to 
nation-build following years of authoritarianism and repression.  Restorative justice aims 
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to address material and emotional loss through dialogic processes and to empower all 
stakeholders in a crime, including victims, perpetrators, and the society.92  In several 
cases, new governments had offered amnesties to perpetrators of crimes in order to 
achieve peace.  These conditions meant mechanisms other than trials were needed to 
respond to “disappearances” and other crimes.  Truth commissions emerged as a 
formalized way to investigate and document these crimes, allowing victims to voice their 
experiences.  Particularly notable are the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, first in 
Chile and Argentina and later in South Africa, which prioritized truth-telling through 
public testimonies by victims.93  These commissions operated on the assumption that 
successful reconciliation requires public exposure of truth, and set peace as the goal 
rather than justice in a punitive sense.94  Though confined within specific nations, these 
transitions built on international human rights language that emerged following World 
War II, allowing for the application of transitional justice mechanisms in other contexts.  
Moving beyond retributive justice, these programs sought to heal entire societies. 
 The third phase of transitional justice emerged when international criminal trials 
began to complement local forms of transitional justice like truth commissions.  These 
trials include the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as hybrid courts for 
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Sierra Leone and Cambodia.95  These prosecutions manifested the principle of individual 
responsibility for mass atrocities in international criminal law.  Though these tribunals 
existed alongside restorative mechanisms like truth commissions, their modest and 
impractical inclusion of a reparations regime did not represent a significant departure 
from the fundamentally retributive nature of international justice.96  The proliferation of 
human rights law and the increased use of humanitarian justifications for international 
intervention in this period led to what Teitel called the “normalization of transitional 
justice.”97  States now began to tolerate procedures that challenged state sovereignty, the 
politicization of justice, and departures from prevailing international criminal law. 
Allen also identifies the end of the Cold War as a turning point for transitional 
justice.98  With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies had reduced 
incentives to support regimes committing or complicit in atrocities.  In addition, new 
techniques in television news coverage and campaigns by human rights groups raised 
awareness of abuses committed around the world.  The ICTY and ICTR, despite many 
criticisms, reinforced the international jurisdiction to punish war crimes and crimes 
against humanity that applies to all states.  By holding individuals accountable, they 
sought to individualize guilt in an effort to deter group blame that could perpetuate 
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conflict.99  These tribunals also established the concept of “universal jurisdiction,” which 
obliges national judicial systems to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity 
because they affect all people.100  This principle is incorporated into Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute, which allows for universal jurisdiction over cases referred to the Court by 
the Security Council.101 
Constructing “Transitional Justice” 
 By the end of the twentieth century, a handful of scholars began using the term 
“transitional justice” to describe periods of transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy, particularly in countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe.  Ruti Teitel’s 
Transitional Justice (2000) and Neil Kritz’s three-volume compendium Transitional 
Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (1995) were 
particularly instrumental in the crystallization of the field and the proliferation of the 
term.102  Both Kritz and Teitel conceived of transitional justice as necessarily linked with 
the emergence of democracy, describing legal, constitutional, and administrative 
phenomena characteristic of post-authoritarian states.   
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 The experiences of Latin American countries, where military forces continued to 
exercise power even after democratic transitions, were particularly influential in the early 
development of the field.103  In many of these cases, new governments employed 
mechanisms in addition to criminal prosecutions to seek justice for past abuses while 
promoting the establishment of liberal democracy.  Kritz’s Transitional Justice adopted a 
comparative, legalistic approach to describe these processes, examining commissions of 
inquiry, lustration, and restitution or reparations programs, as well as criminal 
prosecutions.104  Kritz suggested that these transitional justice mechanisms both hold 
perpetrators accountable and promote societal healing.105  Priscilla Hayner’s 1994 
comparative study, “Fifteen Truth Commissions,” marked another foundational 
examination of transitional justice, arguing that truth commissions can help a state come 
to terms with a history of widespread human rights violations.106  Hayner’s study revealed 
a “cathartic” response to successful commissions, while less successful commissions 
failed to report a “truth” that resonated widely enough to facilitate transition. 
Teitel aimed to develop a theory of transitional justice by examining the legal 
practices employed by transitional societies in response to legacies of repression.  She 
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argued that law has an independent capacity to effect transformative policies by 
balancing principles of ideal justice with political pragmatism.107  Through legislation, 
adjudication, and administrative measures, governments can condemn the past and 
embark on a pathway toward a more just future.  These measures can include the issuing 
of amnesties, reparations, and apologies, which aim to achieve justice at the individual 
level by giving victims’ their due and at the collective level through the establishment of 
liberalizing policies.108  What results is a “provisional, hyperpoliticized” transitional 
jurisprudence that symbolizes legitimacy in the transformation to a liberal state.109 
These early works on transitional justice identified two normative goals that 
continue to underlie the field: (a) achieving justice for victims and (b) establishing a more 
just, democratic order.110  The second goal distinguishes transitional justice from the 
broader field of human rights.  While human rights aims to establish and defend norms, 
transitional justice also aims to identify causal relationships between power and injustice 
in order to facilitate transition.  These goals animated the field in the 1990s and early 
2000s, when transitional justice theories and practices expanded in response to the 
experiences of Eastern European and sub-Saharan African countries.111  Transitional 
justice then began to apply to contexts in which a society may not be in a distinct period 
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of transition from authoritarianism to democracy but still aims to remedy past abuses and 
establish a more just society.  In addition, transitions from neo-patrimonial governments 
in some sub-Saharan African countries required transitional justice mechanisms to be 
enacted by non-state actors, as the state, previously considered responsible for the 
measures, may be weak or absent.112 
While a single theory of transitional justice has yet to emerge, the literature on 
transitional justice identifies a common set of concepts, goals, and claims for legitimacy 
experienced by societies emerging from conflict or authoritarianism.  In addition, it 
describes a number of mechanisms that may help achieve justice for victims and facilitate 
transition to a more just society.  Some regard transitional justice as offering a range of 
mechanisms that can be tailored to fit the specific needs and context of a transitional 
society.113  This study defines “transitional justice” as any programmatic effort to pursue 
transitional justice’s two normative goals, achieving justice for victims of grave crimes 
and pursuing a more peaceful and just future. 
Transitional Justice and The Rome Statute  
The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by the UN 
General Assembly in 1998 marked the international institutionalization of the principles 
and practices of transitional justice that had developed throughout the twentieth century.  
The Court can hold individuals accountable for international crimes in cases that meet its 
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requirement of complementarity, which states that the Court shares jurisdiction with 
member states, and that states must prosecute offenders domestically when possible.114  
The ICC may only pursue cases when the member-state is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute domestically.  The Court can also only consider crimes that occurred on the 
territory of a State Party or by a national of a State Party.  In addition, only crimes 
occurring after the date of enforcement, July 1, 2002, fall under Court jurisdiction.  
Investigations can begin at the will of the Chief Prosecutor, by a UN Security Council 
referral, or by a State Party Referral.  This “universal jurisdiction” permanently 
establishes international criminal prosecutions.115 
As explained above, transitional justice lacks a single clear definition.  
Regardless, any conception of transitional justice necessarily requires mechanisms that 
incorporate both retributive and restorative principles of justice with the goals of 
redressing past injustices and preventing future injustices.  With this understanding, 
Articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute, which delimit reparations to victims in the ICC 
and the role Trust Fund, respectively, appeal directly to mechanisms of transitional 
justice.116  These articles provide for victim participation in criminal proceedings, 
protection of victims and witness during proceedings, the right to reparations or 
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compensation, and a trust fund to make reparations and assist victims.117  These rights 
granted to victims represent both the interests of individual victims and greater interests 
of peace and justice by helping victims regain lost dignity.118   
The Rome Statute’s unprecedented focus on victims and the inclusion of a 
reparations regime distinguishes the ICC and TFV as innovative and potentially powerful 
tools of transitional justice.  Mahmoud Bassiouni summarizes the ways in which 
provisions for victims distinguish the Court from earlier international tribunals: 
This instrument recognises several significant principles concerning victims: (1) 
victim participation in the proceedings; (2) protection of victims and witnesses 
during Court proceedings; (3) the right to reparations or compensation; and (4) a 
trust fund out of which reparations to victims may be made.119  
 
Several scholars have acknowledged the unprecedented inclusion of victims in 
international criminal justice through the Rome Statute.120  The commitment to victims is 
evidenced by the early acknowledgement of victims in the Statute’s preamble, which 
states that “during this century, millions of children, women and men have been victims 
of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”121  This focus 
on victims arrives even before the reference to “peace, security, and well-being of the 
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world.”  Dwertmann suggests that this wording implies that individual and collective 
interests are inclusive, and the Rome Statute system is not meant to prioritize one over 
the other.122   
Bassiouni notes that the extent that these provisions will be practiced and funded 
will determine their success at achieving restorative goals.123  Heidy Rombouts and 
Stephan Parmentier advocate a “process-orientated approach to reparation” that 
prioritizes inclusion of victims.124  Extensive inclusion of victims in the development of 
reparations schemes can help the TFV and ICC respond to the local justice needs of a 
specific context.125  Some have raised practical and theoretical concerns with victim 
participating in criminal proceedings.126  For example, victim participation in criminal 
proceedings will necessarily be limited due to the amount of victims involved in mass 
atrocities.  Nonetheless, the Court’s reparations regime has the potential to have 
widespread effects.   
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Although the Court does not specify the purpose of its reparations regime, its 
mandate implies two goals.127  First, Court-ordered reparations align with contemporary 
concepts of justice, which call for the punishment of convicted criminals—a retributive 
goal—as well as their obligation to repair harm caused to victims to the fullest extent 
possible—a restorative goal.  Second, reparations help hold individuals accountable for 
the gravest crimes by addressing how those crimes affected victims.  Dwertmann 
acknowledges the importance of this latter goal: 
Most victims will hardly be satisfied by a criminal conviction unless their harm is 
repaired in addition to the penalties applied.  As the criminal proceedings and the 
conviction focus on the perpetrator, the reparation order made against the person 
convicted by the ICC shall primarily serve the needs and interests of victims.  In 
the context of international criminal justice, these are determined by the harm 
suffered as a result of the crimes under international criminal law.128 
 
Since the scope of the crimes considered by the Court will prevent full reparation to 
victims, reparations should focus on the broader restoration of social order and 
reconciliation.129 
While the Trust Fund can administer Court-ordered reparations, its own 
reparation awards can be funded with its “other resources.”  When the guilty party is 
unable to make reparations, the international community can supplement reparations 
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through donations to the Trust Fund.130  The impact of Court-ordered reparations is 
limited, however, for two key reasons.  First, Court-ordered reparations arrive only after 
criminal convictions.131  Convictions can take years and, in some cases, may never occur 
if the perpetrator is never caught or dies before prosecutions.  Second, a direct link 
between the convicted individual and the harm suffered by the victim must also be 
established.  In many cases, this link will be difficult to identify with the necessary 
certainty.  In addition, many victims of mass atrocities may suffer from crimes not 
directly related to the few individuals prosecuted.  These limitations can leave victims 
waiting for years with harms unaddressed. 
The Trust Fund’s assistance mandate proffers a response to these limitations on 
Court-ordered reparations.  Assistance programs can begin as soon as ICC investigations 
open in a situation country, removing the dependence on prosecutions.  In addition, the 
assistance mandate also gives the TFV a broader scope of beneficiaries than Court-
ordered reparations by allowing it to finance measures that benefit the current needs of 
victims and their families.  This assistance cannot technically be considered reparations 
because they are not linked to the perpetrator of the crime that caused the suffering.132  
Nevertheless, Trust Fund assistance appeals to restorative principles, as described on 
behalf of the TFV Board of Directors by Archbishop Desmond Tutu: 
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[W]hen a country,  a nation, the international community says, symbolically 
‘we cannot compensate you but we want to show that we care, we want to 
show you that we hope that this small thing that we do for you will somehow 
pour balm on your wounds and help those wounds to heal […]’133 
 
These reparative effects align with the restorative goals of reparations and have been 
incorporated into transitional justice theory.  
Conclusion  
 More than half a century after World War II, transitional justice has evolved to 
incorporate more varied conceptions of justice.  Transitional justice’s earliest 
incarnations, the post-WWII trials, left a heavy mark on the field, as evidenced by the 
emphasis on criminal prosecutions following the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
Sierra Leone, as well as in the Rome Statute.  Despite the popularity of truth 
commissions in practice in the 1980s and 1990s and among transitional justice scholars, 
the Rome Statute neglects to incorporate any sort of truth-telling mechanism outside of 
criminal prosecutions.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Rome Statute embraces victim 
participation, reparations, and reparative assistance, in contrast to the precedent 
established by preceding international tribunals 
In this way, the Rome Statute represents a major endeavor into transitional justice 
at the international level.  Through prosecutions, reparations, and reparative assistance, 
the ICC and TFV pursue both restitutive and restorative ideals of justice in an effort to 
redress and prevent mass atrocities.  While prosecutions can yield reparations, these 
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reparations must directly link the harm suffered by the victim to the crime committed by 
a convicted person, which limits the timeliness and scope of assistance to victims.  By 
providing assistance before convictions to victims in situations under investigation by the 
Court, the Trust Fund may help remedy this shortcoming.  The required connection 
between the Court investigation and Trust Fund assistance distinguishes TFV activities 
from other forms of international aid and endows it with a symbolic significance.134  
Unlike other forms of international aid, Trust Fund assistance is a direct response to 
harms suffered by victims and condemned by the international community.  It is thus 
through the TFV assistance that individual victims’ rights and needs are most directly 
recognized by the international community within the context of international criminal 
justice. 
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3. The ICC’s First Case: Uganda 
Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa with a population of about 35 
million.135  Since its establishment as a British protectorate in 1894, the country has 
suffered from decades of violent governance and conflict.  In the past two decades, 
international attention has focused on Uganda due to a violent conflict that terrorized its 
northern region.  These narratives have focused on the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
and in particular its leader Joseph Kony, as an inexplicable source of brutal violence and 
destabilizing chaos.  Though no one would dispute the LRA’s brutality, the northern 
conflict, like all conflicts, is the product of intricately intertwined political, economic, and 
social realities.  While a comprehensive attempt to understand the conflict and its roots is 
beyond this study’s scope, brief reviews of Uganda’s post-colonial history, the 
emergence of conflict in the north, and the International Criminal Court’s investigation in 
Uganda set the foundation for an examination of the Trust Fund’s operations in the 
region. 
Post-colonial history 
Since its independence from Britain in 1962, Uganda has faced violence from 
rebels and national armies as different leaders struggled for power and legitimacy.  This 
history laid the roots for the LRA conflict that would come to terrorize northern 
Uganda.136  Political violence in post-colonial Uganda began in 1966, when Prime 
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Minister Milton Obote violated the 1962 constitution to declare himself president.137  
Obote followed this declaration with an attack on the residence of the Kabaka of 
Buganda, which forced the constitutional president into exile.  In 1971, Idi Amin, the 
commander of the national army, overthrew Obote and began the executions of 
prominent Acholi intellectuals and politicians.138  In 1973, Amin massacred Acholi and 
Lango who served in the military, and thousands fled the country, some forming the 
Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) and other anti-government groups.  In 1979, 
after organizing in Tanzania, these groups succeeded in overthrowing Amin, and Obote 
returned to power after rigged elections, beginning the Obote II regime.139 
 Both Amin and Obote operated violent regimes, rife with human rights abuses.  
Violence often occurred along roughly ethnic and religious cleavages, which the regimes 
exacerbated to their advantage, leaving a country divided between north and south.140  
Obote, of the northern Lango ethnic group, favored Acholi and Lango northerners, who 
had also dominated the military since its construction under British administration.141  
While many northerners considered Obote’s policies to be the ‘decolonization of the 
north,’ people from other regions felt marginalized during his reign.  Following his 
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capture of the government, Amin, from the West Nile region, massacred Acholi and 
Lango in the military and killed unarmed civilians in revenge.142   
 In 1981, Yoweri Museveni founded the National Resistance Army/Movement 
(NRA/M) and began an antigovernment insurgency.143  The NRA fought the UNLA in 
the northwest of Uganda and in the Luwero Triangle region north of Kampala.  UNLA 
officers overthrew the Obote II government in July 1985, and UNLA General Tito 
Okello, an Acholi, became president.  Soon after, a peace and power-sharing agreement 
between the NRA and UNLA was brokered in Nairobi, but the NRA ignored the 
agreement and captured Kampala in 1986, leading Museveni to assume the presidency.  
Museveni’s presidency ended the succession of rulers from the north that began at 
independence.144  UNLA soldiers retreated north into Acholi regions and into Sudan, and 
a number of rebellions emerged throughout Uganda.145 
The Northern Conflict 
Museveni’s assumption of the presidency sparked years of conflict in northern 
Uganda, leading to the 2003 referral of the situation to the ICC.146  Soldiers from the 
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national army, the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), fled to the north, 
fighting against Museveni’s National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) in response 
to anger that Museveni had broken a power-sharing agreement brokered with Okello in 
December 1985.147  Supporters of Okello and another former president, Milton Obote, 
joined forces in South Sudan after the UNLA’s defeat by NRA in 1986, forming the 
Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA).148  The UPDF also included Acholi 
politicians and former troops of former dictator Idi Amin.  The 1988 Gulu Peace Accord, 
offering amnesty to UPDA combatants, brought most rebels out of the bush and many 
joined the national army.149  The Accord also called for attempts to address political and 
economic issues in the north. 
After the UPDA’s defeat, some surviving rebels joined with other anti-
government forces to form the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), headed by the spirit 
medium Alice Auma “Lakwena.”150  Lakwena’s movement offered “hope for worldly as 
well as spiritual redemption” for the Acholi people, who had lost political power and 
were threatened by the new order.151  The HSM garnered massive popular support among 
northern Ugandans, who feared Museveni’s government, which they perceived as 
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dominated by western Ugandans who would marginalize them.152  They also resented 
cattle raids and atrocities they suspected the NRM sponsored.153  The HSM won several 
of its initial battles, startling opponents with unusual antics, such as marching partly 
naked, glistening in oils from cleansing rituals, and holding out bibles in the face of 
gunfire.154  In 1987, the NRM defeated the HSM in Jinja, about 50 miles from the capital 
and Lakwena fled the country.155 
Both the UPDA and HSM mobilized popular grievances against the new 
government to recruit soldiers.  A working paper by the Refugee Law Project identifies 
several of the reasons that the rebellions resonated with many Acholi: 
[T]hey feared reprisals for what many perceived to be Acholi-led massacres in the 
Luwero Triangle during the early 1980s; they were upset at their loss of political 
and economic power as a result of Museveni’s violation of a 1985 power-sharing 
agreement, and destructive cattle raids that they believed were sponsored by the 
NRM; they were afraid the new government – believed to be controlled 
exclusively by western Ugandans – would marginalise them after their dominance 
in the national army; they were defending themselves against atrocities committed 
by certain NRA units in 1986-7; and they saw violence as the only means to 
address these grievances after witnessing Uganda’s successive violent power 
struggles since independence.156 
 
When Joseph Kony’s Lord Resistance Army emerged after the HSM’s demise, it failed to 
mobilize these unaddressed grievances, instead commanding control using fear and 
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violence inspired by “apocalyptic spiritualism.”157  Kony, a former UPDA commander, 
attracted UPDA soldiers who refused to give up arms following the 1988 Gulu Peace 
Accord and kidnapped others.  Initially targeting government fights, Kony soon turned 
against civilians. 
 The emergence of the LRA initiated a decade of brutal conflict between the rebels 
and the Government of Uganda (GoU) that devastated northern Uganda, as well as parts 
of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Central African 
Republic (CAR).158  Beginning in 1991 with Operation North, the GoU launched several 
military offensives in failed attempts to wipe out the LRA.  These assaults, including 
Operation Iron Fist in 2002, Operation Iron Fist II in 2004, and Operation Lightning 
Thunder in 2008, punctuated attempts to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in 
1994, 2004-2005, and 2006-2008.  In 2000, the GoU gave into pressure from the north 
and passed an Amnesty Act offering immunity to all rebels since 1986 who gave up their 
arms.159 
Some reports suggest the GoU did not pursue the peace negotiations of 1994 and 
2004 seriously and argue that Museveni had political and personal reasons for 
perpetuating the conflict in the north.160  Tim Allen suggests that the conflict in the north 
helped Musveni garner support in the rest of the country, which associated the north with 
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unpopular former presidents.161  In addition, Allen suggests that Museveni had a personal 
grudge against Kony and that ongoing conflict had economic benefits for Museveni’s 
soldiers.  The 2008 talks, however, were received optimistically due to the involvement 
of Southern Sudan as a mediator, the increased international attention to the conflict, and 
personal statements by the LRA leadership suggesting a commitment to the talks.162  LRA 
and GoU representatives signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in August 2006 and 
reached agreements on accountability and reconciliation in the summer of 2007.  The 
2008 discussions aimed to conclude these achievements with a permanent ceasefire, but 
the talks eventually collapsed when the LRA failed to appear at the final signing 
ceremonies.163 
After the 2008 peace talks failed, the GoU launched Operation Lightning Thunder 
as a joint offensive with the governments of the DRC and South Sudan.164  With the 
support of the United States military, this offensive targeted the LRA base in Garamba 
Park in the DRC, but the LRA fled before the offensive arrived.  This offensive did 
manage to scatter the LRA, which began to operate in small groups in the DRC, South 
Sudan, and the CAR.  Some reports claim LRA sightings as far north as Darfur.165  
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Massacres continued in the DRC, and the International Crisis Group reported that the 
LRA has killed more than 2,400 and abducted more than 3,400 civilians since Operation 
Lightning Thunder.166  The LRA continued to survive by smuggling gold and ivory and 
forging alliances with local militias.167  Despite the assistance of 100 armed military 
advisers deployed by the United States, Kony has yet to be captured.  The most recent 
reports suggest that the LRA is involved in the ongoing conflict in CAR.168 
International Crimes, ICC Referral, and Victims’ Needs 
 The last major attacks by the LRA against civilians occurred in northern Uganda 
in late 2005.169  A December 2008 attack by the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces 
(UPDF) on the LRA headquarters in the DRC marked the end to the government’s efforts 
to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict.170  Despite this relative peace, many northern 
Ugandans continue to suffer due to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
by both the LRA and the UPDF.  Allegations of UPDF crimes include regular looting and 
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rape in camps for internally displaced persons.171  In addition, reports have accused 
UPDF soldiers of tortures, assault, and unlawful killings.  Most of these crimes went 
unpunished.172  The UPDF also forced the displacement of nearly two million people, 
about 95 percent of the population of Acholiland.  In response to the real and imminent 
threat of the LRA, the UPDF sometimes only gave individuals 24 hours to leave their 
homes, but many reported that the UPDF either looted or allowed looting in their 
homes.173  Disease and violence in the camps led to the death of tens of thousands of 
people.174 
 LRA crimes included killing, torture, abduction, slavery, forced marriage, forced 
recruitment, mutilation, sexual violence, serious psychological harm, and pillaging and 
destruction of property.175  These violations were indiscriminate, systematic, and 
widespread, often targeting the elderly, women, and children.  Some of the most brutal 
activity includes beating or crushing civilians to death, dismembering them, and burning 
them alive.176  The LRA also forced civilians, including children, to kill family members 
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and friends.  Between 24,000 and 28,000 children and 28,000 and 37,000 adults are 
estimated to have been abducted between the early 1990s and April 2006, and abductees 
faced a wide range of abuses.177  
 Several of these crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, to which Museveni 
referred the situation in December 2003.178  The following January, Museveni joined the 
ICC Chief Prosecutor Ocampo to announce the beginning of investigations, which started 
in June 2004.  In October 2005, the ICC announced arrest warrants for five top LRA 
leaders: commander Joseph Kony and his second-in-command Vincent Otti, as well as 
Dominic Ongwen, Raska Lukwiya, and Okot Odhiambo.179  Since then, none of the 
indicted has been apprehended, and Otti, Lukwiya, and Odhiambo have died.180 
 When the Trust Fund for Victims began its field operations in Uganda in 2008, 
northern Uganda continued to reel from unaddressed suffering.  A population-based 
survey in northern Uganda in 2005 found strong support for a variety of transitional 
justice mechanisms, including public acknowledgement, truth-recovery, and 
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reparations.181  The survey identified sustained peace and the availability of food as the 
top priority of victims.  Accountability for crimes committed by all sides was also a 
priority, with 66 favoring the punishment of perpetrators and 22 percent preferring 
forgiveness, reconciliation, and reintegration.   
 A follow-up survey in 2010 found that security improved dramatically since 2007, 
with 80 to 90 percent of respondents saying they felt “safe” or “very safe” in their 
communities.182  Despite this improvement, civilians in the region continue to face 
challenges regarding sustaining a livelihood, with socio-economic indicators showing 
little or no improvement since 2007.  A large majority, 84 percent, still wanted 
accountability for crimes, but justice priorities shifted from peace and security to the 
fulfillment of basic needs, such as food, agriculture, education, and health care.  Many of 
the challenges civilians faced in meeting the fulfillment of basic needs stemmed from 
injustices that occurred during the conflict.  Reparative mechanisms could help victims 
by providing assistance for victims to regain access to their homes or land, funds to help 
cultivate land, access to education and vocational training, physical and mental health 
services for victims of burns, mutilations, rape, and other violence.183 
                                                
181 Phuong Pham et al., “Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes about 
Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda,” Human Rights Center University of California Report 
(2005), 4. 
182 Phuong Pham and Patrick Vinck, “Transitioning to Peace: A Population-Based Survey 
on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and Justice in Northern Uganda,” Human Rights Center 
University of California Report (2010), 2. 
183 “The Dust Hast Not Yet Settled,” xxi. 
49 
 
The ICC in Uganda 
 In January 2004, the ICC Chief Prosecutor Ocampo stood by Ugandan President 
Museveni to announce the referral of the LRA conflict to the Court.184  This 
announcement of an ICC investigation in northern Uganda ignited a cacophony of debate 
and discussion.  As the first ICC investigation, the case focused international attention on 
the Court, Uganda, and transitional justice.  The debates concerning transitional justice 
discussed in Chapter 1 had a new face, and a body of research emerged to examine the 
effects and implications of ICC investigations in ongoing conflicts, and particularly in 
Uganda.  In Uganda, these debates have primarily concerned whether the Court promotes 
peace, deters conflict, or is biased in its investigations.185   
Peace 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, advocates of transitional justice frequently argue that 
criminal prosecutions can contribute to peace and reconciliation by achieving justice, 
constructing truth, and individualizing guilt.186  However, both scholars and local leaders 
in northern Uganda have raised questions about whether the Court’s investigations and 
indictments have helped secure peace.  Proponents argue that the investigations focused 
international attention on the LRA, pressuring them to negotiate and isolating them from 
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influential supporters, including the Government of Sudan.187  These advocates suggest 
that the ICC investigation helped initiate the Juba Peace Talks of 2006-2008. 
Critics of the Court’s effect on peace question the ICC’s relevance in initiating the 
Juba talks, pointing out that processes that led to the talks began several years before.188  
They counter that even if the ICC helped lead to the talks’ initiation, the Court’s 
irreconcilability with the Amnesty Act prevented their successful completion.189  Reports 
show that the LRA announced at the talks’ onset that it would not sign any agreement as 
long as warrants for the leadership remained outstanding.190  After the 2004 
announcement, local leaders and researchers in northern Uganda argued that the Amnesty 
Act was a necessary precondition for successful resolution of the conflict.191  As the talks 
progressed, Museveni agreed to offer amnesty to LRA leadership, despite the conflict 
with the Court, and made a statement in 2008 that he would not hand over Kony to the 
Court.192  Meanwhile, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC continued to demand 
accountability for the crimes of the LRA.  This argument is mirrored by the Court’s 
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advocates, who suggest that amnesty for LRA leadership “would compromise the 
effectiveness of the ICC and bring questions about whether the ICC can really carry out 
its mandate.”193 
Whether the ICC alone led to LRA leadership’s failure to sign the agreements is 
difficult to determine, but its insistence on accountability did not likely help.  Other 
factors contributing to the talks’ failure could include distrust between the LRA 
leadership and delegation and personal rivalries between some of the mediators, 
facilitators, and donors involved in the talks.194  Some claim that the LRA never intended 
to complete the talks, instead using them to buy time to stockpile weapons and refill its 
ranks through abductions in the DRC.195  Regardless, former LRA commanders and 
members of the LRA and GoU delegations have claimed that Kony’s primary concern 
with the talks was his lack of trust in the GoU’s promises, which conflicted with its legal 
obligation under the Rome Statute to arrest him. 
Local perceptions regarding the Court and the peace process express mixed 
opinions.  According to one population-based survey in northern Uganda, 65 percent of 
respondents supported the amnesty process, while 76 percent of respondents believed that 
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individuals who committed abuses should be held accountable.196  Allen suggests that 
these conflicting responses might be due to confusion about the term “amnesty,” which 
from Luo can be translated as forgiveness or reconciliation.197  While many critics of the 
Court attempt to pit justice against peace, this survey suggests that northern Ugandans do 
not view the two as irreconcilable. 
Deterrence and Isolation 
 Another question debated in the Ugandan context is whether ICC intervention 
deters violations of human rights or exacerbates violence.  In theory, the ICC can deter 
crimes by ending impunity.198  In addition, the ICC could reduce violence by isolating 
indicted war criminals from various sources of support.199  While the level of violence has 
reduced in Uganda since 2005, it is difficult to determine how ICC intervention affected 
this trend. 
Deterrence 
Scholars who claim the ICC promotes deterrence suggest that LRA commanders 
who have not yet been indicted have refrained from committing atrocities out of fear of 
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Court prosecution.200  In addition, the deterrence effect has led the Ugandan army to 
improve its human rights conduct due to ICC presence in the country.201  Recent reports 
suggest that institutional reforms, such as the establishment of a Human Rights Desk 
within the army, have indeed improved the UPDF’s human rights record.202  These 
reports also suggest that UPDF soldiers who commit crimes are increasingly held to 
account.  While the process of improving the UPDF’s human rights record began before 
the ICC intervention, most changes took place after the ICC became active in the 
country.203 
Another way the ICC might have helped deter human rights violations is by 
helping to strengthen rule of law and accountability.  Some scholars credit the ICC for 
helping to establish the International Crimes Division (ICD) of the Ugandan High Court 
in 2008.  The ICD was strengthened by Rome Statute national implementing legislation 
passed in 2010 and has the capacity to prosecute ICC crimes at the national level.204  
These reports also credit the ICC with raising accountability issues during the Juba talks 
that led to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, which paved the way for 
post-conflict accountability. 
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Critics of the deterrence claim point to reports of LRA attacks on humanitarian 
organizations in northern Uganda, which followed the announcement of investigations in 
2005.205  However, similar attacks occurred as early as 2001.206  Critics also suggest that 
rather than deter violence, ICC indictments contributed to the marginalization of rebels 
and led to retaliation attacks.  Advocacy groups also expressed concerns that the 
indictments would lead the LRA to increase violence against its own ranks in an effort to 
maintain its soldiers.207  In addition, reports of decreasing violence tend to focus only on 
Uganda, while the LRA has continued its campaigns in DRC, CAR, and South Sudan.208  
Reports that the indicted commanders continue to commit crimes also undermine 
deterrence claims.209 
Isolation 
The Court’s advocates claim that by focusing attention on the LRA, the Court 
isolated rebels from international support, forcing them to the negotiation table.210  
Following the ICC indictments, international scrutiny came in the form of a UN Security 
Council condemnation of the LRA and the arrival of the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda, both in 2006.  Reports also suggest that the 
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LRA delegation in the Juba talks obsessed about the ICC, indicating the Court’s pressure 
on the rebels.211  In addition, some claim the Court’s intervention cut off the LRA from 
external sources of support, particularly the Government of Sudan.  The United State’s 
inclusion of the LRA on its list of terrorist organizations in 2002 may have contributed to 
pressure on Sudan to terminate support for the LRA and to allow the UPDF to pursue the 
LRA on Sudanese territory in 2004. 
Skeptics of the isolation claim point out that a variety of other processes helped 
lead to the negotiations that began in 2006.  The UPDF’s increased military pressure on 
the LRA combined with the 2000 Amnesty Act had significantly weakened the LRA, as 
many rebels defected, including some mid-level and senior commanders in 2004 and 
2005.  Civil society organizations in northern Uganda contributed to the defections by 
advocating for the return of rebels through radio broadcast.212  Some suggest the ICC 
received credit for the success of local processes that had been ongoing for years.213  
Pressure for Sudan to terminate support for the LRA also extended to processes 
preceding the ICC intervention, such as the 1999 Nairobi Agreement between the 
governments of Uganda and Sudan and the 2005 peace agreement between the 
government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army.  Even if these preceding 
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processes contributed to the isolation of the ICC, it is difficult to deny that the ICC made 
it more difficult for the government of Sudan to support the LRA.214 
Bias 
Accusations of bias have confronted the Court since the announcement of its 
investigations in 2004.  The joint press conference of Chief Prosecutor Ocampo and 
Museveni created the impression of ICC bias in light of widespread awareness that both 
sides of the conflict committed human rights abuses.215  Its location in London also fueled 
memories of British colonialism.216  Some scholars and many individuals in northern 
Uganda suspect the president of using the ICC as a tool to confront the LRA and obscure 
his army’s own abuses.217  Onan Acana, the paramount chief elect, challenged the 
impartiality of the Court in an interview with Allen: “How can the ICC be impartial if it 
is only working one side of the conflict? … We have soldiers raping men.  We have 
people thrown in pits. … Where government soldiers have committed crimes, should we 
just ignore it?”218  Allen argues that despite awareness of the UPDF’s crimes, their 
prosecution would be more difficult because defendants would be able to claim their 
actions were in response to LRA massacres.219 
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In response to the criticism, Ocampo made clear that the ICC would investigate 
both sides of the conflict.220  In addition, he invited religious and local leaders to the 
Hague in an expression of serious attention to their concerns.221  Nonetheless, many 
remained skeptical.222  The reluctance of the Court to explain its operations in Uganda 
make it difficult to determine whether bias played a role in the Court’s initial 
investigations preceding the indictments.223  Although Ocampo did announce 
investigations of the UPDF, no indictments were issued against any member of the 
Ugandan government or military.  One defense of the ICC appeals to “gravity criteria,” 
defined in Articles 17 and 52 of the Rome Statute.  This argument suggests that the LRA 
crimes are significantly graver than those committed by the UPDF, which means the 
Court should focus on the LRA.  The Court claims it has not focused on violations that 
occurred within camps because it is focused on “instrumental killing” and not the indirect 
effects of conflict.224  Michael Drexler argues that this represents trading “principle for 
practicality,” as ICC jurisprudence is not limited to instrumental killings.225  Northern 
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Ugandans have understood the Court’s arguments as trivializing the forced displacement 
of hundreds of thousands of people at the hands of the government.226  
Conclusion 
 This chapter sought to depict the background leading up to ICC investigations in 
Uganda and eventually the Trust Fund’s arrival.  The LRA conflict, a result of years of 
political instability and violent governance, precipitated the Court investigation, which 
Ugandans and the international community widely scrutinized.  Initial research suggests 
that the Court’s relationship with peace and deterrence is multifaceted.  The ICC 
investigation may have prevented the conclusion of peace talks, but it also likely 
contributed to a strengthening of the human rights culture in the national military, 
increased accountability and rule of law, and the end of external support for the LRA.  
Many of these debates will remain unresolved until the Court’s prosecutions end and 
scholars can study the subject retrospectively.   
More timely, however, are the post-conflict needs of the northern Ugandan 
population.  Survey data suggests that for years following peace in the region, victims 
reported needs that appeal to both restitutive and restorative values.  The population has 
consistently demanded accountability and rejected amnesty for perpetrators of war 
crimes.  At the same time, the population has increasingly prioritized socio-economic 
needs, which have remained unmet since the conflict devastated the population’s 
livelihoods.  These mixed wants and needs lend support to the holistic approach to 
transitional justice, which calls for the incorporation of various approaches to justice 
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depending on the unique situations of the harmed individuals and society.227  It is in this 
context that the Trust Fund’s broad focus on reparative assistance can complement the 
Court’s criminal prosecutions. 
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4. The Trust Fund For Victims in Uganda 
Implicit in the criticisms of the Court described in the previous chapter is the 
concern that the Rome Statute system has, through the ICC, established a conspicuous 
display of Western ideals, dangerous when transplanted into the Ugandan context.  As the 
Court’s overlooked sister organization, the Trust Fund may placate these concerns 
through its explicit and broad focus on assisting victims.  By directly addressing the 
needs of victims, the Trust Fund can localize international justice through reparative 
programs.  By linking their assistance to an international condemnation of injustices, the 
Trust Fund can endow its assistance with a symbolic significance that has psychological 
benefits for victims.   
This chapter explores these two claims through an examination of the TFV’s 
operations in northern Uganda.  The chapter begins by reviewing the TFV’s institutional 
and regulatory context, which shed light on the normative motives behind and structural 
restraints on TFV programming.  It then considers the TFV’s three types of 
programming—material support, physical rehabilitation, and psychological 
rehabilitation—and attempts to link its projects with principles of justice.  Finally, this 
chapter considers findings from original interviews conducted with key stakeholders in 
northern Uganda in May 2013.  The chapter concludes that the Trust Fund largely 
achieves the transitional justice goals implicit in the Rome Statute; crucial shortcomings, 
however, concern the TFV’s efforts to link its assistance with the ICC and to transition 
responsibilities to the government. 
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Context of TFV Programming 
 Amidst ICC controversy, the Trust Fund began its operations in Uganda in 2007, 
when it implemented an assessment to identify the necessary types of assistance 
interventions.228  Its assistance programs in northern Ugandan and the DRC began in 
2008, following approval by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber.229  That year, the Chamber 
approved 34 projects for the two situations.  The Trust Fund’s operations in Uganda have 
been relatively consistent in scope since 2008.  In 2013, the TFV oversaw 28 active 
projects, providing support to more than 110,000 victims.  
The Trust Fund’s funds can stem from a variety of sources.  Resources collected 
through fines, forfeiture, and for the purpose of reparation awards must be used in 
accordance with ICC rules of procedure.230  The Assembly of State Parties can also 
decide to allocate funds to the Trust Fund and determine their use.231  Voluntary 
contributions from governments, international organizations, individuals, corporations, or 
others comprise a substantial portion of the Trust Fund’s budget.232  With the exception of 
states, contributors can earmark up to one-third of their contribution for a specific 
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purpose, as long as it does not result in discrimination.233  The most recent program report 
indicates that in the preceding year, States contributed about €3 million to the fund, 
while institutions and individuals contributed about €4,500.234 
Voluntary contributions and funds allocated by the ASP can be used to provide 
“psychological rehabilitation or material support for the benefit of victims and their 
families.”235  Trust Fund projects can help meet the specific needs of a larger scope of 
victims than afforded by Court-ordered reparations.236  This assistance can begin as soon 
as investigations begin, and unlike reparations are not continent on the results of Court 
proceedings.  In this way, the Trust Fund can provide “interim relief” to victims awaiting 
criminal convictions.237 
According to Trust Fund Regulations, beneficiaries of assistance can be “victims 
of crimes under the jurisdiction of the court as defined in rule 85 of the rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, and, where natural persons are concerned, their families, who have 
suffered physical, psychological and/or material harm as a result of these crimes.”238  
Unlike Court-ordered reparations, Trust Fund projects can thereby assist victims and 
families of victims of cases not necessarily prosecuted by the ICC, including individuals 
                                                
233 Reg. 53, Trust Fund Regulations. 
234 The Trust Fund For Victims, “Programme Progress Report Summer 2013,” (2013). 
235 Reg. 50, Trust Fund Regulations. 
236 Dwertmann, The Reparation System of the International Criminal Court, 287. 
237 Ibid., 288. 
238 Reg. 42 and 45, Trust Fund Regulations. 
63 
 
harmed more generally by the situation under investigation.239  In particular, the Board of 
Directors emphasizes assistance that places emphasis on “the most marginalized and 
vulnerable victims.”240  To target beneficiaries that fall under the assistance mandate, the 
Trust Fund uses two strategies to ensure victims fall within ICC jurisdiction.241  First, the 
TFV provides assistance to specific categories of victims, such as victims of sexual 
violence and youth associated with arms forces.  Second, the TFV offers assistance to 
affected communities, including villages victimized by pillage, massacre, or 
displacement.   
  According to TFV Regulations, the Trust Fund has discretion over assistance 
projects that use money received through voluntary contributions.242  When the TFV 
Board of Directors decides to implement a project, it must notify the Chamber to ensure 
that the activity does not pre-determine issues to be determined by the Court, violate the 
presumption of innocence, or infringe upon the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial.243  This in effect gives the Chamber veto power over Trust Fund proposals. 
 The Trust Fund implements its support through partner organizations, which 
include local and international NGOs, hospitals, and community-based organizations.244  
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The ICC’s Procurement Unit assists with partner selection, which often constitutes a 
competitive bidding process or sole sourcing.245  Partners are selected for projects after 
the Fund concludes a field-based assessment to discern the needs of targeted 
communities.246  Examples of these partners include international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) including AVSI, the Centre for Victims of Torture, and CARE 
International Uganda, as well as local organizations (often with international funding) 
including the Diocese of Northern Uganda and Watato Childcare ministries.247 
 According to an external evaluation of the Trust Fund conducted by the 
International Center for Research on Women, the grant-making process prioritizes a few 
key principles:  
participation by victims in program planning, sustainability of community 
initiatives, transparent and targeted granting, and accessibility for applicants that 
have traditionally lacked access to funding, addressing the special vulnerability of 
girls and women, strengthening capacity of grantees and coordinating efforts to 
ensure that the selection and management of grants is strategic and coherent.248 
 
The Trust Fund works with these partners to reach out to victims, their families, and 
communities to meet its goals of promoting accountability, ownership, dignity, and 
empowerment.249 
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TFV Programming    
 Under its assistance mandate, the Trust Fund implements projects that fall under 
three categories: material support, physical rehabilitation, and psychological 
rehabilitation.250  More specifically, according to the TFV Program Framework, Trust 
Fund projects are designed to address four themes: (1) promoting community 
reconciliation, acceptance, and rebuilding community safety nets; (2) mainstreaming 
gender to include addressing impact of gender-based violence and other sexual violence 
of women, men, and children in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325; (3) 
integrating and rehabilitating child soldiers and abductees into communities, including 
support of intergenerational responses; and (4) addressing issues of victims’ stigma, 
discrimination, and trauma.251  The Trust Fund considers these goals crucial steps toward 
ending impunity for perpetrators and establishing peace and reconciliation in post-
conflict settings, two goals that neatly align with transitional justice ideals.252 
 Before issuing grants, the Trust Fund conducts field assessments to ensure that the 
projects directly address harms causes by the conflict under ICC jurisdiction and target 
the most vulnerable and marginalized victims.253  After the 2007 assessment, the Fund 
                                                
250 Ibid., 12. 
251 Ibid., 61; “The Two Roles of the TFV,” Trust Fund for Victims, available at 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/two-roles-tfv. 
252 McCleary-Sills and Mukasa, “External Evaluation of the TFV,” 13; “Assistance to 
Victims of Sexual Violence,” Trust Fund for Victims, 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/success-stories/assistance-victims-sexual-violence. 
253 Interview by author, Kampala, Uganda, May 17, 2013; McCleary-Sills and Mukasa, 
“External Evaluation of the TFV,” 15. 
66 
 
submitted 18 projects in northern Uganda to the Pre-Trial Chamber that focused on 
physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and material assistance to four categories 
of victims: (1) ex-child soldiers, abducted persons, and victims of sexual and gender-
based violence; (2) mutilated victims and physical injuries; (3) handicapped victims and 
victims suffering mental trauma; and (4) victimized villages and traumatized 
communities.254  These projects have been administered in 18 northern Ugandan sub-
districts within Acholi, Lango, Teso, and West Nile sub-regions.255  In 2013, these 
projects were estimated to have provided assistance to 39,750 victims under ICC 
jurisdiction. 
 In 2013, the Trust Fund began phasing out its material support in northern Uganda 
to place more emphasis on physical and psychological rehabilitation.256  The Trust Fund 
and Chamber justified continued physical and psychological support in the region 
because it is likely that these injuries are causally related to the conflict, while 
establishing a causal link between the conflict and material conditions is more difficult.257 
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Material Support 
 Material support includes access to safe housing, vocational training, reintegration 
programs for former child soldiers, support for village savings and loans associations, 
grants for education, and classes in literacy.258  This support aims to improve the 
economic status of victims by responding to the destruction of property and the disruptive 
consequences of displacement.  The establishment of Village Savings and Loan 
Associations (VSLAs) with implementing partners including CARE Uganda, COOPI, 
and the DNU is one effective way of supporting victims’ livelihoods.  The VSLA model 
has also been used to mobilize dialogue on sexual and gender-based violence, as the 
VSLAs became a safe space for members to share their experiences with one another.259 
 Other material assistance programs including the provision of vocational training 
for bee-keeping, improved agricultural techniques, tree-planting, and the increase of 
commercial crops.260  One major example of material assistance programming is TFV 
support of the North East Chilli Producers (NECPA), which has coordinated about 30 
groups of chili producers, mostly women, as a new source of livelihood. 
 According to the external support, TFV partners achieved or surpassed their 
objectives in material support, as portrayed by the high numbers of victims participating 
in communal savings groups or completing vocational training or literary programs.261  
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These material support programs are designed to help beneficiaries attain a sustainable 
livelihood.  This assistance directly responds to the looting of cattle, destruction of 
agriculture, and loss of property that occurred at the hands of both LRA and UPDA 
soldiers.  Some of the projects, such as the VSLAs, have the immaterial benefit of 
providing victims with a support group of individuals who shared similar experiences. 
Physical Rehabilitation 
Physical rehabilitation may include the provision of prosthetic and orthopedic 
devices, bullet and bomb fragment removal, reconstructive and general surgery, and 
referrals to medical services for victims of sexual violence.262  These programs aimed to 
help victims recover and resume their roles of productive and contributing members of 
their societies.263  These projects addressed injuries including burns, mutilations of ears, 
noses, or lips, and loss of limbs due to amputation, burns, or landmines.264  Projects 
included provision of prosthetics, physiotherapy, corrective surgery, and psychological 
support. 
Major implementing partners for physical rehabilitation include Stitching 
Interplast Holland, AVSI, AYINET, and Caritas.265  AVSI, the primary implementing 
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partner in the provision of prosthetics, included community outreach and a program of 
sensitization of public officials on the rights of persons with disabilities.266  In addition, 
AVSI helped with construction to improve accessibility to public buildings.  An 
Interplast program, from 2008 to 2011, focused on cost-sharing and capacity building by 
providing reconstructive surgeries and training local medical staff and nurses in care for 
reconstructive surgery and burns.267  Implementing partners also refer victims, depending 
on their specific needs, to specialized providers for corrective surgery, fitting for and 
provision of prosthetics, and physiotherapy.  The majority of beneficiaries of physical 
rehabilitation also were given access to psychological and material support, as designated 
by the TFV policy for an integrated approach. 
According to the external evaluation, these programs provided victims “with an 
extensive degree of physical healing that enables them to function as normally as possible 
in their communities and to participate in regular community-based activities.”  This 
success demonstrates a direct response to the needs victims expressed in post-conflict 
surveys and assessments, which prioritized rebuilding of livelihoods through physical 
rehabilitation.268  In addition, TFV support of the Gulu Regional Orthopedic Workshop 
(GROW), helped ensure the sustainability of the intervention.  Through its partners, the 
TFV providing training of GROW employees to help care for prosthetics in the long-
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term, with the support of AVSI.269  TFV funding also fostered capacity-building in local 
hospitals for corrective surgery.270  The Government of Uganda has yet to assume 
financial responsibility for these services, which means victims’ preference for 
government accountability remains unmet.271 
Psychological Rehabilitation 
 Psychological rehabilitation includes individual and group based trauma 
counseling, community-led rituals to heal memories, and community sensitization around 
the rights of victims to promote reconciliation.272  Crimes including murders, abductions, 
disappearances, forced marriage, and sexual violence fall under ICC jurisdiction and can 
have psychological consequences the TFV can address.273  These interventions include 
efforts to reduce stigma associated with psychological needs.   
TFV efforts toward psychological rehabilitation in Uganda have taken the form of 
three types of interventions.274  First, the Center for Victims of Torture (CVT) provided 
training and mentoring in the provision of trauma counseling for implementing partners, 
including COOPI, Caritas, and CTV.  Second, implementing partners trained community-
based counselors to provide psychosocial support to victims and groups of victims.  
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Third, COOPI implemented community therapy sessions through community-based 
facilitators and by the Diocese of Northern Uganda through the Healing Memories 
Project.  According to the external report, victims reported that the psychological support 
had helped them adopt a more positive outlook to life and to re-engage in community 
activities.275  The report also noted that many respondents, especially survivors of gender-
based crime, said the assistance helped them stop blaming themselves for the crimes they 
experienced.  Being able to work was attributed as the greatest factor contributing to 
positive mental health, again aligning with surveys suggesting that recovering livelihoods 
is a primary post-conflict need for victims. 
 Many TFV-sponsored psychological programs adopt a group-based model that 
employs a lay volunteer or psychological assistant to conduct the sessions.276  This 
approach helps expand psychosocial support to diverse and distant settings and assuages 
anxiety associated with seeing individual counselors.  In addition, by providing a space 
for victims to share their stories, group therapy contributes to healing and truth-telling, 
which align with the goals of reconciliation and societal healing. TFV psychological 
support also provided capacity-building through a partnership CVT, which trained 
implementing partners to recognize and respond to psychological needs of victims. 
Reconciliation 
 According to the ICRW external report, the Trust Fund integrated reconciliation 
and reintegration efforts into their programs in a concerted effort to pursue peace-
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building.277  The conflict in northern Uganda left the region’s social fabric in ruins.  
Abducted children, survivors of sexual violence, and children born as the result of rape 
often face difficult reintegrating into society.278  Many children and young adults missed 
out on years of regular education, and women subverted usual gender norms by becoming 
the sole providers in their families, as husbands were targeted for killings, abductions, 
and recruitment into the conflict.  These changes resulted in a disruption in the usual 
social culture of northern Uganda and pitted groups and individuals against one another. 
Reconciliation efforts took the form of trauma and therapeutic counseling; 
distribution of reintegration kits; drama groups and community peace activities; youth 
camps’ peace schools with drama, discussion, and art therapy; vocational training; and 
training elders and traditional leaders on peace building and reconciliation strategies.279  
Many of these projects align with other transitional justice efforts, which seek to promote 
societal reconciliation through truth-telling, reconstructing social identities, and 
reproducing a sense of security.280 
Interview Findings 
 Interviews conducted in May 2013 with key informants from partner and non-
partner organizations of the Trust Fund for Victims generally aligned with the 
conclusions of the ICRW external report.  Each type of assistance—material support, 
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physical rehabilitation, and psychological rehabilitation—has made significant 
contributions to the rehabilitation of individuals affected by the conflict.  Interviews with 
implementing partners also suggest that two eligibility requirements of Court-ordered 
reparations rarely prevent the accessibility of TFV assistance to individuals who suffered 
from the conflict.  First, program managers at two major implementing organizations said 
they are flexible regarding the requirement that victims’ crimes occurred in 2002 or later, 
when the ICC jurisdiction began.  If they cannot offer assistance under a specific TFV-
funded project, the TFV support may free up other funding for the organization to assist 
the victim on its own.  In some cases, the implementing organization will refer the victim 
to another organization who can implement the project without the time limitation.  
Second, program managers said that assistance is offered to individuals who fall into any 
of the categories of victims specified by the TFV, regardless of whether the LRA, the 
Ugandan army, or another party committed the atrocity.  This programming appeals to 
both normative goals of transitional justice.  By responding to harms of past abuses, the 
TFV helps redress human rights violations.  Through capacity-building and reconciliation 
efforts, the TFV helps prepare the society for a more justice future.  
Despite these successes, interviews revealed two areas of shortcoming that raise 
questions about the Trust Fund’s ability to achieve justice for victims.  First, nearly every 
interview participant raised concerns about TFV communication efforts.  Individuals 
involved directly in the administration of TFV-sponsored programs said that beneficiaries 
of TFV assistance rarely had heard of the Trust Fund and did not understand the TFV’s 
relationship with the ICC.  Only one respondent, a program manager at an international 
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NGO, said the TFV was actively explained to program beneficiaries.  In addition, 
respondents in non-partner organizations, whose goals nonetheless closely aligned with 
the Trust Fund’s, said the partner selection process lacked transparency.  While some had 
heard of the TFV through its outreach efforts, most respondents, despite their daily work 
in post-conflict rehabilitation and interest in the politics of the ICC, had a limited 
understanding of the TFV’s mission.  Individuals at the Trust Fund acknowledged the 
weaknesses of their communication efforts, citing limited resources and administrative 
capacity as the culprits.  The TFV lacks a distinct department or personnel devoted to 
communication and relies on the ICC’s Communication and Outreach Unit.281  These 
findings recall conclusions of population-based surveys that estimate very low levels of 
awareness and understanding of the ICC.282 
 A second concern that emerged in interviews regarded the principle of 
complementarity, which, according to the Rome Statute, stipulates that the ICC and TFV 
should only intervene to the extent that the national government is unable to prosecute 
perpetrators or provide redress for the crimes.283  This principle mirrors the consensus in 
transitional justice literature that when a perpetrator is unable to provide redress for a 
harm, that responsibility falls on the government.284  If the government is also unable to 
provide redress, that responsibility may extend to other actors, such as the international 
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community.285  However, surveys of victims suggest that they feel the government bears 
the primary responsibility for the provision of post-conflict redress, and the extent to 
which the Trust Fund can or should assume this role is undetermined.286  The Trust 
Fund’s work with the Ugandan government is limited, as are Ugandan efforts to provide 
assistance through its Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan.287  A regional manager 
for the Ugandan Human Rights Commission in northern Uganda expressed a limited 
understanding of the TFV’s mandates or operations in her region, and a senior official in 
the TFV viewed attempts to work with the GoU as improbable. 
Conclusion 
 This case study finds that the Trust Fund’s operations in northern Uganda make 
progress toward the normative goals of transitional justice by redressing past abuses and 
working to prevent future injustice.  Material support, physical rehabilitation, and 
psychological rehabilitation address the array of crimes suffered by the northern Ugandan 
population.  Flexibility at the level of implementation allows the assistance to be offered 
to a broad scope of victims.  In this way, the TFV helps meet the immediate justice needs 
of victims in northern Uganda, while pursuing the normative goals embraced by 
transitional justice theorists and advocates. 
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To maximize its impact, the TFV should focus attention on the two programmatic 
weaknesses revealed in interviews: communication and transitioning responsibility.  The 
tradeoff between increased communication and increased assistance to victims may seem 
like an obvious decision, but the connection between the TFV assistance and the 
beneficiary’s status as a victim of an international crime is crucial.  An understanding of 
international condemnation of the harms suffered by victims contributes to victims’ 
psychological rehabilitation.288  Further, the relationship between the assistance and the 
harms suffered by victims complements the retributive mechanisms embodied by the 
Court with restorative ideals of justice.289  Without this symbolic distinction, TFV 
assistance is indistinguishable from other forms of international aid.290   
In addition to capacity building in hospitals and village communities, the Trust 
Fund must make direct efforts to transition responsibility to the government.  Without 
this transition, the duration of the Trust Fund’s operations in the region will continue to 
be indefinite.  Presumably, the Trust Fund would terminate its programming in an ICC 
situation region once the causal link between a victim’s harm and the conflict under ICC 
jurisdiction disappears or it deems the suffering of victims under Court jurisdiction 
sufficiently redressed.  However, as acknowledged by TFV personnel in interviews, 
victims may suffer psychological and physical harm for decades following a conflict.  
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Ending operations before community members feel their suffering has been redressed 
could create resentment of the TFV, and, by association, the ICC and the international 
community at large, as indicated by interview participants who believed the Trust Fund’s 
termination of material support was premature.  Actively working with the government 
could reduce this risk.291 
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5. Conclusion 
 As of April 2014, the Rome Statute had 139 signatories and 122 parties.292  Even 
the United States, which has failed to ratify the treaty due to concerns of state 
sovereignty, has embraced the Court by referring cases through the UN Security 
Council.293  This widespread international support suggests nearly universal approval, at 
least by states’ political elites, of the mechanisms of justice institutionalized by the 
Statute.  Despite this support, many criticisms of the ICC system and transitional justice 
more broadly stem from concerns of their impacts on local populations or lack of 
significance and legitimacy to victims.  This thesis has sought to move the debates on the 
ICC and transitional justice in a new direction, one that seeks to understand the 
implications of reparative assistance provided through a frame of international justice. 
 As argued in Chapter 2, the Rome Statute establishes a system directly concerned 
with the principles of transitional justice.  All conceptions of transitional justice rely on 
the dual goals of redressing past abuses and transitioning to a better future, and the Rome 
Statute system seeks both these goals.  The Court responds to past abuses through 
criminal prosecutions and Court-ordered reparations.  These two mechanisms are both 
restorative and retributive; they punish perpetrators with reparations and other sentences, 
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deter future crimes, and provide a feeling of “justice served” that can be meaningful to 
victims. 
At the same time, the Trust Fund operates on a primarily restorative model, 
redressing past abuses through various forms of assistance designed to help victims return 
to their previous standards of living.  By focusing on physical rehabilitation, psychosocial 
support, and material support, the Trust Fund responds to victims’ immediate needs, 
which victims care more about than criminal accountability.294  In addition, the Trust 
Fund helps promote an improved future through capacity-building at the local level.  
Capacity-building begins to respond to the structural injustices that led to the crimes in 
the first place, but additional attention should be placed on transitioning responsibilities 
to the government, which victims perceive as the party most responsible for redress.  
While these mechanisms cannot address accusations that the Court is biased against 
Africa, they do resolve claims that the Rome Statute system epitomizes a “Western” form 
of justice. 
 The Trust Fund also responds to calls to incorporate local perceptions by 
designing annual projects based on evaluations of victims’ needs; however, these efforts 
could be expanded.  It bears reminding that recent empirical research on transitional 
justice suggests that local participation is the most important feature of successful 
transitional justice programs.295  The TFV could further assist victims through additional 
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involvement of victims at the project design and implementation levels, which research 
has shown to have rehabilitative effects for victims.296  As suggested by Minow, “The 
process of seeking reparations, and of building communities of support while spreading 
knowledge of the violations and their meaning in people’s lives, may be more valuable, 
ultimately, than any specific victory or offer of a remedy.”297 
One unanswered question is whether the Trust Fund does enough to connect its 
programming with the ICC and, by extension, the international community.  This 
connection between the Rome Statute, with its widespread international support, and the 
assistance offered to those who have suffered international crimes, has symbolic 
importance that can help victims recover.298  This international condemnation of harms’ 
suffered by victims elevates Trust Fund assistance from international aid to international 
justice.  Future research on the Trust Fund should examine this question in the TFV’s 
second situation country, the DRC.  TFV programming in DRC is distinguished from 
programming in Uganda because the ongoing violent conflict precludes TFV employees 
and partner organizations from acknowledging their connection to the ICC.299  The 
absence of an explicitly acknowledged connection to the Rome Statute raises questions 
about how the Fund is able to distinguish its assistance from international aid.  
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 Future research on transitional justice should continue to examine the role of 
“reparative assistance.”  Unlike reparations, reparative assistance does not rely on 
criminal prosecutions or a direct link between a harm suffered by a victim and a crime 
committed by a perpetrator.  This acknowledges the often-ambiguous lines between 
victims and perpetrators in many conflicts and can expand reparative assistance to a 
broader scope of individuals affected by the conflict.  Whether victims perceive this 
assistance as justice, in Trust Fund situations and elsewhere, warrants further study.  In 
addition, future research should seek to understand what types of assistance are most 
meaningful to victims in transitional societies.  Moving beyond top-down, “one-size-fits-
all” approaches, future transitional justice endeavors may find the Trust Fund a worthy 
model to offer reparative assistance uniquely tailored to victims’ needs.  Through the 
TFV’s reparative assistance, the Rome Statute has pioneered a mechanism of transitional 
justice ready for testing in other contexts. 
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